When Russia invaded Ukraine within the spring of 2022, President Vladimir Putin incorrectly assumed it could be a swift takeover.
The truth is, three years on, negotiators from each nations are tentatively exploring the concept of a negotiated approach out of a largely stalemated battle.
So what did the Kremlin’s preliminary evaluation get incorrect? Other than underestimating the vulnerabilities of Russia’s army, analysts have recommended that Moscow additionally miscalculated the assist Russia would obtain from Ukrainians within the nation’s east who’ve shut ethnic ties to Russia.
Our not too long ago revealed examine on Ukrainian sentiment towards Russia earlier than and after the invasion backs up that assertion. It demonstrates that even these Ukrainians who had shut ties to Russia based mostly on ethnicity, language, faith or location dramatically modified allegiances instantly following the invasion. For instance, simply previous to the invasion of 2022, native Russian audio system in Ukraine’s east tended accountable the West for tensions with Russia. However instantly after the invasion, they blamed Moscow in roughly the identical numbers as non-Russian-speaking Ukrainians.
Furthermore, this shift was not only a short-lived response. Three years after the invasion, we adopted up on our survey and located that Ukrainians nonetheless blame Russia for tensions to a level that was by no means so unanimous earlier than 2022.
A pure experiment
Our examine is a component of a bigger venture exploring how efficient Russian propaganda has been at influencing Russian-speaking adults in sure former Soviet states. Our inaugural survey was launched within the fall of 2020, whereas the query concerning tensions between Ukraine and Russia was first posed in February 2022, instantly previous to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Surveys had been accomplished by over 1,000 Russian-speaking folks in Ukraine − excluding Crimea and the breakaway Donbas area for safety causes − and in Belarus. Whereas the spring surveys in Ukraine had been performed in individual, the others had been carried out by phone as a result of political state of affairs in every nation.
Belarus was chosen as a result of it shares an analogous historic, linguistic and ethnic background to Ukraine, however the two nations have diverged of their geopolitical paths. Shortly after the autumn of the Soviet Union in 1991, Belarus, like Ukraine, cast forward in trying to construct democratic techniques. However after Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko got here to energy in 1994, the nation turn into an authoritarian state with a excessive dependence on Russia for political and financial assist.
In broad phrases, Ukraine has had an reverse trajectory. Relations between Ukraine and Russia fluctuated over the preliminary years of independence. However for the reason that Maidan revolution of November 2013 to February 2014, a staunch pro-Western management has emerged.
Nonetheless, sure segments of the inhabitants in Ukraine continued to carry affinities towards Russia – most notably, the Russian-speaking older technology within the nation’s east.
Our surveys present a type of pure experiment trying on the impression of a Russian invasion on earlier pro-Russian public sentiment.
Ukraine serves because the “treatment” group and Belarus as a “quasi-control” group, with the distinguishing issue being a Russian invasion. The questions we requested: “Who do you think is responsible for the worsening tensions between Russia and Ukraine?” and “In general, how do Russian policies affect your country?”
Ukrainian, American and Russian delegates meet for peace talks on Could 16, 2025, in Istanbul, Turkey.
Arda Kucukkaya/Turkish Overseas Ministry through Getty Photos
Converging blame
We discovered that in Ukraine, however not in Belarus, geopolitical views had been sharply unified by the expertise of the invasion. On one stage, this isn’t shocking – in any case, the folks of a rustic being invaded can be anticipated to carry some extent of resentment to the invading military.
However what we discovered most fascinating is that this impact in Ukraine massively overrode the cut up amongst numerous identities earlier than the invasion. This was most outstanding in folks’s perceptions of who was accountable for rising tensions.
Previous to the invasion, 69.7% of respondents in Ukraine total blamed Russia for the tensions between the 2 nations, with 30.3% blaming NATO, Ukraine or the U.S. By August 2022, 97.3% of respondents in Ukraine blamed Russia for the tensions, with solely 2.7% blaming NATO, Ukraine or the U.S.
By comparability, within the neighboring nation of Belarus, 15.5% of respondents blamed Russia for the tensions previous to the invasion, and solely 21.9% of respondents blamed Russia for the tensions after the invasion.
This close to unanimity in Ukraine masks the huge shifts you see when damaged down for demographic variations. For instance, blame assorted broadly throughout areas of Ukraine earlier than the invasion however converged after the invasion. Previous to the invasion, solely 36.0% of respondents within the east of Ukraine and 51.4% of respondents within the south of Ukraine blamed Russia for the tensions. After the invasion, over 96% of respondents in each areas blamed Russia.
The same impact could be seen throughout different demographic variations. Solely 30.6% of Catholics in Ukraine blamed Russia for the tensions previous to the invasion, whereas 83.0% blamed Russia afterward.
What had been as soon as stratified opinions earlier than the invasion turned uniform afterward.
To verify that this pattern was not simply a right away post-invasion blip, we performed the surveys once more in September 2024 and February 2025. The general proportion of Ukrainians who blamed Russia for the tensions remained excessive, with 85.7% and 84.5%, respectively. And once more, these outcomes held throughout the assorted demographic breakdowns.
In February 2025, the newest survey, 77.2% of respondents within the east of Ukraine and 83.0% of respondents within the south blamed Russia. Catholics throughout Ukraine continued accountable Russia, with 90.7% in September 2024 and 90.6% in February 2025. Total, there was a small drop within the percentages of these blaming Russia – with battle fatigue a attainable cause.
Penalties for peace
Our findings counsel that in occasions of collective menace, divisions inside a society are inclined to fade as folks come collectively to face a typical enemy.
And that might have enormous penalties now, as numerous events, together with the U.S., take a look at peace proposals to finish the Russia-Ukraine battle. Among the many choices being explored is a state of affairs by which the present entrance strains are frozen.
This might entail recognizing the Russian-occupied territory of Crimea and the separatist areas of Donetsk and Luhansk as a part of Russia. However it could additionally successfully relinquish Ukraine’s southeastern provinces of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia to Russia.
Whereas our surveys can’t converse to how this may go down among the many folks of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk, the examine did embrace Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. And our findings present that the sense of Ukrainian identification strengthened even amongst Russian-speaking folks in these areas.
